סקס שליטה עוד סקס חינם

The objectives of the operation were the evacuation of state-of-the-art equipment from aeronautical research institutes and the recruitment of high-grade aviation experts for postwar work in Britain. The justifications for an in-depth study are twofold. First, given the significance attached to science, technology and methods of war by the Chiefs of Staff, there has been surprisingly little work on early post-war scientific and technical intelligence.

Instead, the historiography has been dominated by a small number of texts that treat technology transfer from Germany as part of a broader critique of British post-war aviation policy.

One consequence was that by mid, German aerodynamic research had access to more than 78 wind tunnels of which 19 could be used for high-velocity aerodynamics in the transonic and supersonic range. It is probably true to say that in several directions the technical equipment of this establishment is unsurpassed anywhere. He stressed that time was of the essence because the inter-Allied Law No. Within four days a consensus emerged among senior MAP officials on the proposals. This impasse in Whitehall, coupled with ongoing negotiations with the Americans on possible ways to coordinate policies on German scientists, meant that the recruitment of aeronautical experts advocated by Lockspeiser seemed far from resolution.

Collectively, these establishments covered all subjects concerned with the study and development of aircraft with the exception of electronics.

Interrogation of German personnel and the removal of research equipment was the immediate responsibility of the MAP. On 25 July , Professor W. The operation was executed in two phases. Working side-by-side with German scientists, the British staff ran plant and equipment for calibration, testing and the collection of essential data.

This activity was largely completed by late , though a limited amount of running for special projects continued until 15 June Subsequently, the British Scientific Staff supervised monograph writing and catalogued the technical libraries. Using technical experts from British aircraft firms, engineers and specialists from the Ministries of Works and Supply and German specialist and non-specialist labour, the DCRF organized the removal and transfer of aeronautical plant and equipment.

By November , the British Scientific Staff had produced records on German aeronautical experts and selected 74 for inclusion in lists for longterm employment in the UK.

Scientists from the MoS Munitions exploiting rocket technology at Trauen were also instrumental in selecting German missile specialists who contributed to the overall total of scientists in which that branch of the MAP had an interest. Between July and November , the British Scientific Staff interrogated an array of high-grade German aeronautical experts and made their recommendations under the provisions of the DCOS Scheme.

Over the same period, acute barriers hindered the translations of these recommendations into a large-scale recruitment programme. In part, the strict recruitment limits reflected a perceived security dilemma: Germans who have been employed [in Britain] might, at some future date, choose to return to Germany or go elsewhere, and there can therefore be no real safeguard against leakage of defence secrets which they may acquire while working here.

By , this had been replaced by anxieties that British defence secrets might be passed to the Soviet Union. The long term risk is that they [German experts] may make themselves so useful in the defence work on which they are engaged that in an emergency we are faced with the dilemma either that a large number of key positions are held by men of doubtful loyalty, or that the war effort is adversely affected by dismissing them. This edict had two implications. First, it precluded any wholesale recruitment of aeronautical experts residing in the British and American Zones of Occupation.

This reflected a more general pattern: By mid-January , of the 57 experts allotted to the MoS Air and still required some 30 43 per cent were contracted. For the DCOS Scheme as a whole, scientists were allotted and still required, of whom 68 43 per cent had arrived in Britain.

One constraint arises in attempting to trace the downstream effects of the documents and equipment acquired through the operation on post-war British development and manufacture of final weapons systems.

As Judt and Ciesla point out:. Also evacuated to Britain was the LFA library, comprising 4, volumes on air research and allied subjects, and an almost complete technical library on German aeronautical research from the Focke-Wulf library at Detmold totalling 3, separate reports.

These included, from the LFA, a wind tunnel with an electric motor driving fan with an output of 14,hp, a metre firing range designed so that air density and temperature could be adjusted to high altitude conditions, a wind tunnel constructed to subject projectiles to cross winds up to mph and an engine test rig capable of providing the conditions of density, humidity and temperature of altitudes up to 50, feet.

When the equipment was reassembled, Britain had four state-of-the-art aircraft research centres at Farnborough, Bedford, Pyestock and Fort Halstead. Included were individuals that had occupied senior positions in wartime Germany. Between and , one crucial field where the recruits had a tangible impact was high-velocity aerodynamics work at the RAE, Farnborough.

In the later stages of the war attention had been given in Britain to developing a straight-wing experimental supersonic aircraft — the Miles M A significant discovery that came to light in was that the Germans had appreciated the value of sweepback as a means of delaying the impact of compressibility at high subsonic speeds — a factor that had not been fully appreciated in Britain either by the aircraft industry or by the government defence research establishments.

The Allied missions that entered Germany concluded that the extensive work had been conducted on the swept wing in the transonic regime appeared to suggest that the straightwing approach adopted for the M52 was a mistake, and:. When the German data became available, there was concern in the Ministry [of Supply], not least in the Department of Scientific Research and the Directorate of Technical Development.

O rders were given to cancel immediately any high-speed projects which did not incorporate sweepback. An important contribution was made by the aerodynamicists Martin Winter and Hans Multhopp who, in , designed an experimental 55 degree swept-wing transonic research aircraft to be powered by the Rolls-Royce AJ. German wartime developments in themselves were the major post-war stimulus to Britain, America and the Soviet Union to adopt rockets as major propulsive devices.

The DCOS Scheme led to the recruitment, inter alia, of key German wartime specialists with state-of-the-art knowledge and previous experience that was useful in itself, and many of them had wide expertise on the use of hydrogen peroxide as an oxidizer.

At the inception of the DCOS Scheme, security concerns raised by the Home Office and the Security Services led to the decision that German specialists would be employed in government defence research establishments and have only limited contact with industry. The rationale here was that:.

There would be considerable risk in permitting these scientists to have access to firms engaged on highly secret defence contracts … Leakage of information on the long-term trend of secret weapons would indeed be serious.

In practical terms, because the Germans were employed on research work rather than applied development linked to projects in industry, aircraft firms were denied first-hand information on practical aspects of design and manufacture. For example, after , Winter and Multhopp were permitted to work on research aircraft but security concerns precluded their extensive experience being applied on the fighter derivative.

There were also other barriers to integration. In some instances they stemmed from the political records of individual German scientists. First, complaints by some of the Germans about their terms and conditions of employment led to various acrimonious disputes with the research establishments.

This shift in attitudes reflected the high value placed by senior MoS officials on the work of the German experts and their evident desire to secure long-term employment contracts for them. On the one hand, in September , the Treasury pointed out that the Aliens Acts that forbade government employment of aliens, and which had been temporarily overruled when the DCOS scientists had been recruited, would return into force in December The German scientists at RAE because of their specialised knowledge and experience and the time they had been employed, had now become an essential part of the scientific complement, and their loss would be detrimental to the work being carried out.

The original conception of the DCOS scheme, which had in mind the eventual return of aliens to their own country after having given the information which was required of them, had now changed. By January ,78 this high-level pressure led to the removal of legal impediments, and those German specialists required by the government defence research establishments were finally offered unestablished Civil Service appointments on similar terms and conditions to British staff.

After , of the original 87 DCOS recruits some 27 acquired British nationality and many went on to make longer-term contributions to British aeronautics and rocket development. Between and , his work included the design of a missile targeting computer and missile vibration research.

Between and his retirement in , Entres was responsible for the development of UK space policy and overall planning of the British space technology programme — a task that included the coordination of the efforts of industry and government establishments. Similarly, MoS personnel records indicate that experts recruited by the RAE Rocket Propulsion Department, Westcott, including Friederich Jessen and Jurgen Diederichsen, made valuable theoretical and practical contributions to the development of liquid and solid rocket fuels and motors from the lates until their retirement in the mids.

Instead, a limited and largely polemical literature on the British experience has generated a popular orthodoxy that Britain failed to exploit a technological opportunity that was harnessed so effectively by the Americans. Reports of their work into inter-continental guided missiles, today greatly developed and realised in a practical form in the USSR and the US, were dismissed as a Wellsian fantasy or a Jules Verne dream by our people at home.

This assertion is based on comparative recruitment figures: Correspondingly, this critique implies a particular counter-factual history: This popular account raises two issues. The first is why German science more generally, and the DCOS Scheme in particular, figure so little in the historiography of post-war British defence science and technology. On the other hand, a relatively small proportion of British development projects finally proceeded to production.

Between and , the British aircraft industry undertook manned projects that were overtly intended for manufacture, of which just 10 aircraft types were eventually produced in quantities of or more. Also, allows quickly viewing any Flickr photo on black background in large size.

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סקס שליטה עוד סקס חינם

These included, from the LFA, a wind tunnel with an electric motor driving fan with an output of 14,hp, a metre firing range designed so that air density and temperature could be adjusted to high altitude conditions, a wind tunnel constructed to subject projectiles to cross winds up to mph and an engine test rig capable of providing the conditions of density, humidity and temperature of altitudes up to 50, feet. When the equipment was reassembled, Britain had four state-of-the-art aircraft research centres at Farnborough, Bedford, Pyestock and Fort Halstead.

Included were individuals that had occupied senior positions in wartime Germany. Between and , one crucial field where the recruits had a tangible impact was high-velocity aerodynamics work at the RAE, Farnborough. In the later stages of the war attention had been given in Britain to developing a straight-wing experimental supersonic aircraft — the Miles M A significant discovery that came to light in was that the Germans had appreciated the value of sweepback as a means of delaying the impact of compressibility at high subsonic speeds — a factor that had not been fully appreciated in Britain either by the aircraft industry or by the government defence research establishments.

The Allied missions that entered Germany concluded that the extensive work had been conducted on the swept wing in the transonic regime appeared to suggest that the straightwing approach adopted for the M52 was a mistake, and:. When the German data became available, there was concern in the Ministry [of Supply], not least in the Department of Scientific Research and the Directorate of Technical Development.

O rders were given to cancel immediately any high-speed projects which did not incorporate sweepback. An important contribution was made by the aerodynamicists Martin Winter and Hans Multhopp who, in , designed an experimental 55 degree swept-wing transonic research aircraft to be powered by the Rolls-Royce AJ.

German wartime developments in themselves were the major post-war stimulus to Britain, America and the Soviet Union to adopt rockets as major propulsive devices. The DCOS Scheme led to the recruitment, inter alia, of key German wartime specialists with state-of-the-art knowledge and previous experience that was useful in itself, and many of them had wide expertise on the use of hydrogen peroxide as an oxidizer.

At the inception of the DCOS Scheme, security concerns raised by the Home Office and the Security Services led to the decision that German specialists would be employed in government defence research establishments and have only limited contact with industry. The rationale here was that:. There would be considerable risk in permitting these scientists to have access to firms engaged on highly secret defence contracts … Leakage of information on the long-term trend of secret weapons would indeed be serious.

In practical terms, because the Germans were employed on research work rather than applied development linked to projects in industry, aircraft firms were denied first-hand information on practical aspects of design and manufacture. For example, after , Winter and Multhopp were permitted to work on research aircraft but security concerns precluded their extensive experience being applied on the fighter derivative. There were also other barriers to integration.

In some instances they stemmed from the political records of individual German scientists. First, complaints by some of the Germans about their terms and conditions of employment led to various acrimonious disputes with the research establishments. This shift in attitudes reflected the high value placed by senior MoS officials on the work of the German experts and their evident desire to secure long-term employment contracts for them. On the one hand, in September , the Treasury pointed out that the Aliens Acts that forbade government employment of aliens, and which had been temporarily overruled when the DCOS scientists had been recruited, would return into force in December The German scientists at RAE because of their specialised knowledge and experience and the time they had been employed, had now become an essential part of the scientific complement, and their loss would be detrimental to the work being carried out.

The original conception of the DCOS scheme, which had in mind the eventual return of aliens to their own country after having given the information which was required of them, had now changed. By January ,78 this high-level pressure led to the removal of legal impediments, and those German specialists required by the government defence research establishments were finally offered unestablished Civil Service appointments on similar terms and conditions to British staff.

After , of the original 87 DCOS recruits some 27 acquired British nationality and many went on to make longer-term contributions to British aeronautics and rocket development. Between and , his work included the design of a missile targeting computer and missile vibration research. Between and his retirement in , Entres was responsible for the development of UK space policy and overall planning of the British space technology programme — a task that included the coordination of the efforts of industry and government establishments.

Similarly, MoS personnel records indicate that experts recruited by the RAE Rocket Propulsion Department, Westcott, including Friederich Jessen and Jurgen Diederichsen, made valuable theoretical and practical contributions to the development of liquid and solid rocket fuels and motors from the lates until their retirement in the mids. Instead, a limited and largely polemical literature on the British experience has generated a popular orthodoxy that Britain failed to exploit a technological opportunity that was harnessed so effectively by the Americans.

Reports of their work into inter-continental guided missiles, today greatly developed and realised in a practical form in the USSR and the US, were dismissed as a Wellsian fantasy or a Jules Verne dream by our people at home.

This assertion is based on comparative recruitment figures: Correspondingly, this critique implies a particular counter-factual history: This popular account raises two issues.

The first is why German science more generally, and the DCOS Scheme in particular, figure so little in the historiography of post-war British defence science and technology. On the other hand, a relatively small proportion of British development projects finally proceeded to production. Between and , the British aircraft industry undertook manned projects that were overtly intended for manufacture, of which just 10 aircraft types were eventually produced in quantities of or more.

Consequently, as Edgerton points out, these factors conspired to create a situation where:. Correspondingly, the marginalization of German scientists in the historiography of British post-war aeronautics has occurred because many of the DCOS recruits were employed on development lines that ultimately failed to proceed to production for reasons that had little to do with the quality or activities of the German specialists themselves. This implies the need for more research into the role German scientists played across the range of post-war weapon-related development, if only to augment the history of why Britain undertook the projects it did and further our understanding of how and why those projects ultimately performed the way they did.

For example, throughout the lates, Britain encountered chronic shortages in qualified scientists and engineers QSEs in precisely those fields where German expertise seemed to have the most to offer.

The QSE shortfalls were most acute in the aeronautical and guided weapons sectors with the implication that:. Certain vital Radar equipment, Guided Weapons and AA [anti-aircraft] equipments are among the most seriously affected. Lack of suitable staff in the aeronautical field will affect the efficiency of new aircraft and will lead to delays in reaching higher speeds.

More might also have been achieved had Britain followed the US armed services in preserving wartime teams or encouraging greater contact between German experts and aircraft manufacturers. In the British case, the majority of the DCOS recruits had left by , many complaining of enforced isolation. Correspondingly, however, there is evidence that the popular orthodoxy underrates the performance of British policies in three respects. First, the application of hindsight has tended to downplay the constraints on German recruitment that arose from the social and political milieu in which British policy was formulated.

In this light, British policy can be interpreted as a logical response to the prevailing social and political conditions of the time. Second, it is a gross oversimplification to say, as the orthodoxy implies, that Britain was somehow denied access by the Americans to the elite scientists it required. Between December and July , under the inter-governmental agreements implemented by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington, the UK and the US exchanged 35 lists of German scientists required for defence work.

Consequently, when manpower requirements are subjected to closer scrutiny they reveal that Britain either employed or screened all but 21 of the German scientists and technicians listed as required by the defence research establishments.

In cases where Britain and the USA required the same individual, the records show that allocations were made i n accordance with the equity principle agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, so Britain does not appear to have been disadvantaged where competing claims for particular German experts emerged.

In addition to long-term exploitation of German experts through the DCOS Scheme, British policy included two other equally important objectives: British policies also need to be evaluated in terms of the security benefits provided through post-war Anglo-US cooperation on information from German scientists. For example, Britain gave information derived in the early s on German wartime advances on radar absorbent material to the USA that proved to be an important precursor to the development of Stealth technology.

Consequently, collaboration on the German science question, coupled with broader scientific, technical and intelligence information exchange, seems to have assisted British Cold War security interests by enhancing transatlantic defence and intelligence links. The lesson of the research facilities discovered in Germany at the end of the war and their indications of the patterns of future technical development, far in advance of our own conception at the time, went largely unheeded by government and industry alike.

Moreover, it points to the need for more research into the impact of British policies towards German scientists, above and beyond the cohort recruited for work in the UK, on wider Cold War national security interests. An Appraisement and Strategy for Success London: See, for example, Leslie E. John Wiley p. Scarborough House pp.

Derek Wood, Project Cancelled: Tri-Service Press , p. The Supply of Military Aircraft, Cmd. Tom Bower, The Paperclip Conspiracy: Michael Joseph p.

Notable exceptions are the excellent coverage of scientific intelligence in Julian Lewis, Changing Direction London: Sherwood Press , and also in R. Install search plugin "View on Flickriver" Greasemonkey script A Greasemonkey script that adds Flickriver links to various Flickr photo pages - user photos, favorites, pools etc, allowing to quickly open the corresponding Flickriver view. Also, allows quickly viewing any Flickr photo on black background in large size.

Install "View on Flickriver" script Bookmarklet While viewing any Flickr photos page, click on the bookmarklet to open the same view on Flickriver.

Use Flickriver Badge Creator to create a badge linking to any Flickriver view. Link to this photo view: Badge creator Use Flickriver Badge Creator to create a badge linking to your photos, your group or any other Flickriver view. You can place your badge on your Flickr profile, Blog or Website.

Add to your iGoogle or Netvibes page Flickriver widget for iGoogle or Netvibes can display almost any Flickriver view - most interesting today, by user, by group, by tag etc. Firefox and Chrome addons Adds a 'Flickriver' button to your browser. Install in Firefox Install in Chrome.

Search plugin Add 'Search on Flickriver' to your browser's search box. Install "View on Flickriver" script.

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